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American Railroad Accounting Practices

American railroad accounting practices in the mid-nineteenth century
William Zimmermann
Introduction
The nineteenth century was a significant time for the
United States and for American business. The United States
emerged as a world power in this century, evolving from a fledgling coastal state into a continental giant. Much of this geopolitical expansion was fueled through the rapid growth of the
American economy. In order to understand how the American
economy was transformed, it is first helpful to understand how
American business was transformed. This research paper seeks
to answer this question by analyzing the accounting practices
of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. Accounting is the
language of business and can be used to analyze the dynamics
of mid-nineteenth century business. Contemporarily, managers,
investors, and regulators use accounting-based financial reports
to try to better understand a firm’s operations and economic
situation. Therefore, financial reports and commentary on them
from the period will yield critical knowledge on how different
economic agents (managers, investors, creditors, regulators, and
others) interacted and communicated with each other in the
adolescent phase of both American capitalism and corporate
culture.
The railroad industry was chosen because it was the
most significant industry of the mid-nineteenth century and
perhaps the most significant industry of the whole period.
Railroads were the first to adopt a corporate business organization that would later mature to the corporate organization
recognizable today. The reason the railroad industry adopted
large corporate structures was its need to raise large amounts of
capital. Railroads needed to construct and maintain hundreds
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of miles of track, purchase expensive engines, and build stations
to operate the tracks. Railroad managers turned to the public to
find both investors and creditors in order to afford the massive
initial costs required to start railroad. Since the investors were
the actual owners of the railroad, managers needed to integrate
investors into the administration of the firm. This was done almost exclusively through forming a corporation, with investors
electing a board of directors to appoint managers. The number
of investors and size of railroads made them massive organizations, and the capital needs and scope of railroads led to further
development of the corporate form of business organization. A
critically important feature of the American economy’s growth
in the nineteenth century was the maturation and widespread
adoption of corporations in the United States. Since railroads
were the most influential corporations of the mid-nineteenth
century, it is logical to focus on them to understand the wider
economy. Finally, focusing on the mid-nineteenth century will
be insightful because it was the period where annual reports
became truly sophisticated while also remaining unstandardized
by national legislation. Railroads weren’t universally regulated
by the federal government until the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 and annual reports weren’t standardized
until 1906 with the passage of the Hepburn Act, although the
federal government did have some reporting requirements for
railroads that received federal money. Instead, individual states
had a wide variety of regulations and requirements for financial
reporting. Since an important theme of the nineteenth-century
American economy was the early development of modern business, understanding how firms acted without strict guidelines or
standards will be especially valuable.
Financial reporting developed significantly in this period, prompted by the demands of corporations such as railroads.
While financial information had been considered proprietary
during most of the First Industrial Revolution, it was necessary
for railroads to report this information publicly to their owners
Penn History Review
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– the shareholders. This rapid development in the sophistication
of financial reporting was driven both by the legal requirements
of the federal and state governments and by the demands of
investors. During this period, the novelty of financial reporting
and the lack of standardization meant that managers were able
to experiment greatly with how reports were made. Occasionally, this allowed unscrupulous managers to create misleading or
fraudulent reports. For the most part, however, financial reports
of this period were impressively informative and enlightening.
Accounting theory also reached high levels of sophistication,
although it was inhibited by a lack of standardization. This
lack of standardization incentivized managers to choose the accounting methods that reflected well on the firm over methods
that reflected the real economic situation. Much like today,
financial reports were primarily focused on the status of the
company and its profitability. Annual reports usually contained
only information on the balance sheet and income statement.
Since railroads usually used a cash basis, the income statement
somewhat mirrored the cash flows from operating activities,
which could be used to evaluate the firm’s ability to pay debt
and distribute dividends. Managers also used accounting to better understand their operations and gather detailed statistical
summaries. Similar to how investors used accounting to evaluate a firm, managers often used these figures to aid in strategic
decision making. Overall, railroad accounting in this period was
impressively sophisticated.
Federal and State Requirements for Financial Reports
In contemporary America, anyone familiar with business has some familiarity with a Form 10-K. In the United
States and most modern economies, financial reporting for
public companies is a strictly regulated and standardized practice. Governments and standard setting authorities have created
detailed methods on how a firm should assemble and present
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its books to regulators and investors. Beyond government authorities, groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) have created detailed rules on how to prepare financial
statements. These rules, US GAAP from FASB and IFRS from
IASB, have been made by regulators to be the standard method
for accounting in public companies. However ubiquitous now,
this state of affairs should not be taken for granted. Rigorous
and detailed accounting standards did not exist in the midnineteenth century.
Since their inception, railroads have been closely connected to the federal and state governments. The federal and
state governments were very interested in the development and
success of railroad companies, because populating and connecting America’s quickly expanding territory required an extensive
infrastructural network. Furthermore, at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a state charter was usually required or desired for incorporation, so most railroads wanted some level of
state recognition. Therefore, both the federal and state governments were very involved in the establishment and funding of
railroads; meanwhile, other investors welcomed government
participation as a means to receive a favorable charter and continued state support. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or ‘the
B&O,’ provides an excellent example of how this close relationship between state governments and railroads was reflected in
railroad accounting. When the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or
the B&O, was created, “civic pride rather than profits made the
B&O from its origin a ‘community enterprise’.”1 Beyond civic
pride, the B&O almost functioned as a state company and “in
granting the charter for incorporating the B&O, the Maryland
legislature retained the authority to set rates… [and] exempted
the railroad from tax.”2 The railroad’s charter played a very significant role in developing financial reporting in railroads and
beyond. When B&O was incorporated, “the B&O Charter…
required that stockholders be issued an annual ‘Statement
Penn History Review
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of Affairs.’”3 However, that was the limit of the detail in the
statutory requirement. Impressively, this ‘Statement of Affairs’
evolved from “a five-page letter from the president to the investors” in 1827 into an impressively sophisticated annual report
that included “the first modern example of a private corporation reporting revenues and expenses to stockholders” in 1832.4
Therefore, the business environment in which railroads developed not only legally required some form of financial reporting,
but also encouraged the development of sophisticated accounting and reports.
The federal government also fostered the development
of financial reporting through statutes and requirements. Similar to the states, the widespread and generous use of federal
funds in supplying capital to railroads prompted the federal
government to legally require railroads to provide vital information regarding their operations and status. In 1862, Congress
passed the renowned Pacific Railroad Act, which enabled the
Treasury to issue bonds to railroads for the construction of a
transcontinental railroad. In Section 20 of the legislation, the
government required railroads to
[submit to] the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report
wherein shall be … First. The names of the stockholders… Second. The names and residences of the directors… Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the
amount thereof actually paid in… Fourth. A description
of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed
upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of
such surveys ; Fifth. The amount received from passengers on the road ; Sixth. The amount received for freight
thereon ; Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road
and its fixtures ; Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness 5
							
of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof.

The complex and detailed requirements of this legislation demonstrates that the annual reports were, indeed, becoming more and more sophisticated. Further, the evolution of
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the required information from the annual reports of the B&O
charter to the requirements here reveals that governments were
becoming more exacting in the reports they received, acting
as both investors and regulators. Outlined in the legislation,
regulators were requiring the railroads to report on their capital
structure, their revenue and expenses, and the current lines they
were developing or operating.
By 20 years later, railroads had already become the
largest business in the world. Pursuant to statutory reporting
requirements, the Auditor of Railroad Accounts sent the Secretary of the Interior an annual report containing information
on all railroads that had received some form of federal aid. This
report contained vital information on what financial reports really consisted of in the mid-nineteenth century. In Appendix E
of the report, there were three forms the railroads were required
to submit. These were Form No. 8-001, essentially the balance
sheet, Form No. 8-002, a report on the financial and statistical status of the railroad, and Form No. 8-003, essentially the
income statement.6 Remarkably, annual reports had evolved in
the span of just a few decades from brief letters to complex logs
analogous with modern reports. Contained in the 1880 Annual
Report of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts, many railroads’
financials were displayed in such a way that even modern readers can have some grasp of their business’ operations and status.
That ability is the power of financial reports.
Both the federal and state governments mandated the
creation of financial reports for several reasons. Governments’
financial stakes in many railroads is an obvious reason. Much
like other shareholders, governments hoped to ensure that
their investments, grants, or other forms of aid were being used
wisely by management to promote the development and success
of the firm. Another reason for governments to observe railroads’ businesses through financial reporting was due to the use
of railroads as a quasi-state agency. As previously discussed, the
government often had the authority to decide the rates railroads
Penn History Review
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could charge or limit the profit margins of a firm. This was
done purposefully because governments saw the railroad as a
means of promoting commerce and economic activity in the region. This was the tradeoff that firms faced when they accepted
governmental investments. The state vigorously promoted the
expansion of railroads but did this in order to pursue additional
economic and political objectives. Managers, who were content
with receiving government aid, also had to accept this level of
oversight.
The development of financial reports is an important
piece of evidence in revealing this relationship. This is a very
significant observation about the origins of American corporations. The government participated in an intimate way with
the creation and funding of the first American corporations.
This differs greatly from the free-market ideology or politics associated with American corporate culture today. Early railroads
were often created and incorporated by legislatures and later
railroads received significant funding from the federal and state
governments in order to achieve government goals, which were
partially aligned with private investors. Therefore, from its beginning financial reporting was not only just a method to remedy information asymmetries between managers and investors
but was also a mechanism allowing the government to watch
over and control industries it identified as nationally significant.
Management – Goals and Uses for Financial Reports
Although the practice of reporting was required under
legal statutes, managers had a great deal of flexibility in how
they created their annual reports, as comprehensive industry
standards like US GAAP or IFRS had yet to be introduced.
Since managers had such a high degree of agency over their
reports, studying the various reporting methods used by managers can reveal their differentiated prerogatives with financial
reporting. Managers had to report the status of the business to
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regulators and investors, but they were often at the liberty of adjusting their accounting methods to make their firm look more
attractive. Perhaps most interestingly, it seems that managers
also used the creation of annual reports and detailed accounting
to inform themselves about their firm’s financial situation. In a
time before the internet and data science, managers could often
be unaware of many of the details of the railroad’s operations.
Therefore, managers often created detailed microeconomic
analyses of their business while making their financials. Much
like investors, managers were able to use detailed information
on their earnings and operations for strategic decision making.
Early railroad managers’ chief difficulty in creating annual reports lies in the lack of precedents in business. Unlike
contemporary CEO’s and CFO’s, they were never exposed to
a Form 10-K in a business school class. Instead, many railroad
executives chose to mimic existing firms’ annual reports. Since
the B&O was the oldest railroad in the United States, it “was
known as ‘the B&O University’ and its annual reports were
viewed as textbooks about railroading, and engineering and
financial developments disclosed were closely followed by other
railroads.”7 Again, the influence of regulators can be seen, for
the Maryland legislature’s reporting requirements impacted the
practices of railroads far outside of the state. This mimicking
highlights that while there was great variety in annual reporting,
managers were not operating in a bubble and industry standards
did exist within a range of acceptability.
The formal arrangement of three primary statements
(the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash
flows) did not yet exist but reports generally contained substantial information for all three categories. Firms seem to have
almost universally presented a balance sheet (listing assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity) and an income statement
with revenues and expenses. The combination of the balance
sheet and income statement captured some of the information
typically found in a statement of cash flows since “initially most
Penn History Review
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railroad accounting records were kept on a cash basis.”8 The
primary focus of managers seems to have been reporting and
analyzing their revenues and expenses. Similar to contemporary
managerial focuses on ‘free cash flow’ and EBITDA, railroad
managers of the mid-nineteenth century were deeply interested
in their ability to generate cash to fund expansions and pay
dividends and “as a result their reports primarily dealt with the
sources and disposition of cash and with statistical measure of
the flow of traffic.”9 How firms measured their revenues and
expenses, which was an approximation of cash flow, had significant implications for their reported profitability. All of these
reports together (the balance sheet, income statement, and statistical analysis) gave both managers and investors an incredible
view into the operations and health of the railroad.
The creation of annual reports led to many challenges
for accountants, because they often had to develop accounting theory ad hoc. One of the major challenges of this sort for
railroads was accounting for long-lived fixed assets. Valuing the
many miles of railroad tracks was difficult for accountants, but
critically important for managers, since a huge portion of the
total assets of a railroad were in fixed assets like tracks. Even
contemporarily, there are many methods of accounting for
long-lived assets and reporting methods in the United States
that don’t match with the methods employed by taxing authorities. US GAAP allows for straight-line depreciation, sum-of-theyear’s-digits, and several other methods. Meanwhile, the IRS
uses a system called MACRS.
Going back over a century, managers had even less precedent or theory to work with. As explained by James Boockhodlt, there were several popular methods, each with their own
pros and cons. It bears to keep in mind that despite the relative
youth of annual reporting, some of these methods were surprisingly sophisticated and resemble modern accounting standards.
Three quasi-popular methods included: “periodic revaluation,”
which was similar to mark-to-market valuation with pretty
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frequent upward adjustments; an annuity method, which paid
the annuity in order to create a future fund to pay for the replacement of the assets; finally, there was the ‘renewal method,’
which was similar to accumulated depreciation and expensed
the decline of an assets value over time.10 All of these methods
had advantages and disadvantages, but they achieved something
significant: expensing the costs of capitalized assets. Overall, the
development of these methods was evidence of the impressive
improvements in accounting theory during this period. Admittedly, mid-nineteenth century managers had a level of discretion
over the creation of their reports that today would be deeply
unsettling. Despite that, some managers and railroads did produce high quality reports that attempted to give investors a
pretty objective view of their property.
However, some managers were not as noble because
these expenses could have such a major impact on the bottom
line of a railroad. Many wanted to be slyer in their expensing
of capital assets and, in the absence of strict accounting standards, they could get away with what is today euphemistically
called “creative accounting”. While some of the methods tried
to periodically expense some part of their capital assets, most
firms used “the retirement method of accounting for fixed assets… under this method, the expense due to the exhaustion of
property was recognized at the time of the retirement of a unit
of the property.”11 This method ultimately replaced the other
three as the most popular among managers. The justification for
this method was that “as long as the property was maintained
in good repair then no decrease in the value of the asset had
occurred.” In contemporary business, this accounting theory
would not be accepted. Depreciation has man12y definitions,
but economic depreciation is usually characterized as the decline in the future benefits (or cash flows) from the asset due to
its use that year. These assets had a limited lifespan and would
eventually need to be replaced, regardless of what amount of
repair the railroad companies conducted on tracks, engines,
Penn History Review
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and other capital equipment. Therefore, firms should have accounted for this decline with some sort of record of the implied
expense. For shareholders, this was really dubious accounting;
the intrinsic value of their equity was the net of assets and liabilities. With the retirement method, a railroad track would be
worth its capitalized costs until the day it was to be retired and
replaced with new track. Instead of gradual depreciation, on the
day of retirement investors would be faced with a massive loss
in the value of their equity in the firm caused by a sudden drop
in the net value of assets. So, while the accounting justification
of the method was not very firm, there was another justification for its use: retirement accounting was very beneficial for
management. Through the use of this method, managers could
boost their bottom line significantly. Furthermore, many states
set the rates railroads could charge customers, which was often
done by placing a cap on the railroad’s profit as a percentage of
its assets. Therefore, a railroad could set higher rates and earn a
larger profit with a higher asset valuation. In that situation, the
interests of managers and investors were closely aligned against
regulators.
Management’s uses for accounting didn’t end at the creation of annual reports for investors and regulators. Accounting
could also enable management to get an analytical and objective
look at the numbers of their operations. An 1879 treatise written by Marshall Kirkman in The Railroad Gazette captures many
of the managerial uses for accounting and reports. Kirkman was
a unique authority on the development and codification of railroad accounting. He served as the General Accountant and later
Vice President of the Chicago and North Western Railway, and
he was also one of the founders of the Accounting Division of
the American Association of Railroads. In the treatise, Kirkman
lays out modern accounting theory and practices for other managers and accountants in the industry. He confirms the prevailing standard of two statement accounting, saying both “a general balance sheet, then, should embrace a clear, concise summary
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of the liabilities of the company, including its capital stock, also
the property and assets owned by it” and “the income account”
which should embrace “the earnings and incidental expense
accounts of the company” with earnings appearing “upon the
ledger as a credit balance” and expenses appearing “as debit balances upon the general ledger” with “the difference or balance
between the credit and debit” constituting “the Undivided Income of the property.”13 More interestingly, he points out that
accountants and their reports served as vitally important sources
of information for management in this period, since “to the ignorant and unthinking, the various sub-divisions of railway service have apparently little or no relation to each other… [but]
the accountant should possess an intimate knowledge of the minutiae of the different classes of accounts.”14 His approach is decentralized, and he suggests “the returns from agents and others
are, so far as practicable, allowed to reach the general accounting officer through the hands of the department officers and
division superintendents of the company.”15 He maintained that
decentralization ensures that middle management becomes far
more familiar with their operations since “[the] plan enables the
officers to acquaint themselves generally with the details of their
several branches of business without requiring special reports.”16
This use of accounting was significant and valuable to management. Managers who were neither able to look into databases
to see revenue numbers nor access client information were now
able to view detailed reports of their receipts and operations and
have an objective view of their true situation.
Marshall Kirkman was not the only manager who saw
the potential of detailed annual reports for managerial analysis.
Albert Fink, the Vice President and General Superintendent of
the Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, also
wrote a treatise on railroad accounting. In his work, Fink clearly
lays out the importance of detailed and accurate accounting,
saying:
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If the percentage of operating expenses to net earnings, or the
cost of one ton of freight or one passenger transported one mile,
can not be used as an absolute measure of economy, or even as a
measure of comparison, and we have seen it can not, the question arises, what is the proper course to pursue in ascertaining
whether a railroad is economically operated or not?
To this the answer must be given that the only mode of ascertaining this fact thoroughly is to make an examination of each
item of expenditure incurred in the operation of a railroad, and
see whether this has been reduced to a minimum and the service
rendered to a maximum… but even that knowledge would be
of little avail unless the accounts of the operating expenditures
of railroads are kept in such a manner as to exhibit in detail not
only the expenditures, but also the amount of work performed
			
for each item of expenditures. 17

Here, Fink touches on very deep ideas. Fink is coming
close to writing microeconomic theory, approaching railroad
management as an in-depth exercise in cost minimization and
profit maximization. Accounting is central to this managerial
approach and therefore becomes a powerful manager tool for
analysis and informed decision making. One of Fink’s annual
reports composed between the years 1873 and 1874 was even
included as one of the course readings, which includes some
of his statistical measures. Fink and other managers developed
and produced many tables of data and statistics for use by investors and managers alike. Similar to the statistics used in the
nascent art of sabermetrics during this period, managers created
all sorts of interesting ratios and measures. One such statistic
was a ‘movement expenses per ton-mile’ which is equal to the
movement expenses per train mile (sourced from their own data
table) over the average number of tons of freight in each train.
Combining this with three other measures (station expenses per
ton-mile, maintenance of road per ton-mile, and interest per
ton-mile) added up to find the total cost per ton-mile.18 Like a
baseball manager analyzing a player’s batting average and field71
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ing percentage, railroad managers could use these measures
to closely analyze their cost structure. The work of these two
writers, each important and influential managers of the time,
highlight just how sophisticated and powerful accounting had
become. Quickly rising from short memos to investors, annual
reports eventually became sophisticated and detailed enough to
enable managers to use them in order to make strategic decisions.
Shareholders’ Expectations and Frustrations with Financial Reports
Just like the federal and state governments, private
investors were very interested in railroads. Similar to the tech
stocks of the 1990’s into the present, railroads were the exciting
and disruptive industry of the future during the mid-nineteenth
century. However, the motivations of private investors obviously
differed from those of the government. While the government
sought to promote railroads in order to develop the economy
of the country and build infrastructure to connect its distant
regions together, private investors were interested in making
money from their investment. With this motivation for investment, private shareholders were deeply interested in the annual
financial reports of the railroads. These reports were used by
shareholders to assess the position of the firm and the value of
their property; a dependable and trustworthy report was the
only way a shareholder could measure the value of his ownership objectively. Financial reports existed because of government
requirements and investor demand for them, however, their lack
of standardization was a source of aggravation. Many managers
were incentivized, as they still are, to fudge or outright manipulate numbers in their annual report to make their firm look like
a better investment. The variety in methods of reporting and
the desire of some managers to make inaccurate or fraudulent
reports meant that the quality of annual reports differed greatly
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from one report to the next. This was a major issue for investors, and one that caused a good deal of frustration and fear.
In an 1879 edition of the North American Review, an
article entitled “The Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” captured many of the contemporary issues that investors
had with railroad securities. The article zeros in on the lax and
perhaps fraudulent accounting standards of the New York Central Railroad, one of the premier railroads at this time. Investors
could have forgiven the industry if the managers of some fringe
regional railroad were making questionable decisions with their
accounting. Yet, the New York Central, on the other hand, was
one of the country’s premier railroads. If there were serious issues with this railroad, that would have represented an indictment of the whole industry.
The author alleges many issues with the company, starting with a failure of the New York State regulating authorities.
As the author makes clear, “the laws of New York, which, as
they now stand, render possible, either the rendering of no
account whatever of their financial condition, by companies
whose stocks may constitute the sole means of subsistence of
otherwise helpless families, or the publishing of such statements, or reports, as are a mockery of the law, and an insult to
the common sense of every business man.”19 Without proper
enforcement of some level of quality in financial reporting,
the state of business in New York would enter into a bad state.
Honest and objective reporting was critical since “every wellregulated State very properly undertakes to control many of
its public corporation, so that, through a perfect knowledge
of their financial condition, only to be ascertained through
complete and enforced reports, the public at large may know
to what extent it is safe to trust their promises to pay, losses,
interest, or dividends, as the case may be.”20 Because of their
business, railroads were dependent on the public as a source of
capital.
The erosion of public trust and faith in the honesty of
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financial reports could threaten the legitimacy of state authorities and honest businesses in New York. However, at the writing of the article, the demand for New York Central stock was
healthy as the railroad was able to consistently pay a dividend
on the stock. The author makes this clear, saying, “for some ten
years, no perfect “general balance-sheet” has been published by
the company… instead of awakening the suspicions of brokers
and investors, [this] seems to have been entirely ignored. The
market price of the stock has been governed by the fact that it
has paid eight per cent dividends, regardless of the absence of
any proof of its intrinsic value, as indicated by the existence
of a due proportion of assets to liabilities.”21 Just like contemporary bubbles and accounting scandals, investors were either
uninterested in any problems with annual reports, despite their
objective importance, or were unaware of these issues with New
York Central’s accounting. This yields a significant observation:
regulation was critically important, for the public often did not
review annual reports closely as long as superficial indicators of
success like dividends were present.
Despite some investors’ ignorance about dubious reporting, railroads companies were still very sensitive to public
doubts about their securities. The impact of the New York Review article was damning on the railroad industry as a whole,
and it certainly was not the only place such opinions could have
been found. Enough public doubt in the industry could have
led to a severe drop in the share prices of firms across the nation. Yet beyond the dubious or potentially fraudulent annual
reports of the New York Central, the accounting methods used
in formulating such annual reports of many other railroads
could also easily lead to public distrust. As discussed earlier,
conventions such as the retirement method for valuing longlived fixed assets produced annual reports that kept in mind
only the interests of the management, rather than those of the
stockholders. The management of an individual firm was often
deeply interested in dispelling any doubts about the value of
the property behind their own firm’s stocks, especially if these
Penn History Review
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doubts were already being vocalized by stockholders.
In response to the fear of shareholders in their firm,
the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
launched a committee, headed by William Stokely, the Mayor
of Philadelphia, to investigate its accounts and perform a full
audit of their balance sheet. Made in response to complaints
from stockholders, its explicit goal was to “meeting to examine
all the property of the Company… to make an appraisement
of the value of the roads, shops, machinery, real estate, depots,
bonds, stocks, and all other assets of the Company; also, to
examine into the liabilities and obligations of the Company.”22
Similar to the use of annual reports to generate insightful statistics for management, this committee also attempted to investigate “the wisdom of the past policy of your Company, and
to make any suggestions that we may deem likely to conduce
to its greater prosperity in the future.”23 Therefore management
could use the report along with shareholders in order to better
understand the realities of their operations. As always, accurate
reporting could benefit both groups, since objective measurements of the operation allows both investors and managers to
make strategic decisions regarding the company.
The committee quickly proved itself to be much more
than a public relations stunt from the board through the clear
repudiation of several decisions of the firm. For instance, the
committee removed a several million-dollar investment in the
United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company from their
balance sheet because it was a “mythical account” which was
neither “part of the assets or liabilities of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.”24 Apparently, this investment was really the
property of a New Jersey railroad from which the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company leased railroad lines. Whether this mistake
was intentional or unintentional is unclear and the committee
doesn’t make a great effort to investigate this, preferring correction over investigation.
The committee also specifically mentions several costly
mistakes made by management over the years. The report zeros
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in on a group of investments on railroad lines south of Baltimore. The Pennsylvania Railroad focused its operations mainly
in the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, so expansion southwards
was a move out of the norm for the firm. This expansion resulted in failure, with the revenues from the lines barely breaking past the operating expenses incurred. The committee held
nothing back in their criticism of the management’s decision to
expand, stating that “in making investments south of Baltimore
without your consent, by which nearly $5,000,000 have been
lost to your Company.”25 However, the committee immediately
sought to rebuild the confidence of its shareholders, pointing out that this loss “illustrates the dangers against which we
endeavor to guard, as explained in other parts of this report.”26
Through open admission of the mistakes and an effort in the
report to explain methods to avoid another mistake like this in
the future, the committee attempted to win back stockholder
confidence not just in their reports but also their operations.
Overall, it is impressive to see the committee attempting to
win back stockholder confidence by cleaning up past mistakes
and proposing methods to avoid future mistakes. Many other
firms would have not had the same integrity to correct for past
mistakes. The zealous efforts of the committee demonstrates
the Board of Directors’ devotion to its fiduciary duty. Any past
mistakes made by management could be corrected by the committee, with shareholders associating the governance of the firm
more with the committee than with the management.
It is apparent that investor confidence in the veracity
and accuracy of annual reports was shaky at best. Especially for
more business savvy investors, the methods of assembling annual reports could often be seen as unsatisfactory as it could be
difficult to divine the true value of an investment in a firm from
their financial reports. While many firms attempted to remedy
this through investigation committees like that of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, these efforts were perhaps unnecessary. Overall, it seems that the regular payment of dividends was
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the most important factor in winning investors over, regardless
of whether such dividends were sustainable. The author of “The
Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” was an accountant,
or at least anonymously claimed to be one, so naturally as a professional he was able to zero in on issues in the New York Central’s financial reports. Laymen investors who were less able to
interpret annual reports, let alone tease out discrepancies, would
have been less sensitive about their quality so long as such issues were not directly brought to their attention. This highlights
both the importance of honest management and firm regulators, both then and now. Through a combination of the two,
business would remain in high repute, and people of all stripes
could participate in corporate ownership.
Conclusion
The accounting practices of the railroad industry in the
mid-nineteenth century were truly remarkable in both for their
sophistication and rapid development. Prior to the railroads,
businesses were never expected to release any sort of substantial reports. The business of railroads required not only large
numbers of investors and creditors but also an unprecedented
amount of equity and debt. The demand of the investors eventually led to the demand for annual reports. Furthermore, the
federal and state governments, heavily invested in the railroad
business and interested in overseeing their operations, required
annual reports to be made to supervise over the railroads’
status and operations. Thus, both the state and private investors demanded annual reports as evidence of the value of their
property. Coincidentally, the development of railroads as large
and sophisticated corporations was mirrored by the evolution
of their annual reports from brief letters to comprehensive and
sophisticated documents. Beyond the demand from governments and private investors, managers also used accounting and
annual reports as an opportunity to analyze their operations and
gain a better strategic understanding of their firm’s positions.
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Although railroads declined in national importance with
the rise of cars, trucks, and planes, they had lasting impacts on
American business. Other corporations adopted and expanded
on the model of railroads, and their corporate organizations and
practices were highly influenced by them. With that in mind,
these annual reports are especially significant. They not only offer critical insights into the relationships of firms, investors, and
regulators in the 1870’s, but they also have significant implications on how those relationships are formed even today.
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